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Epistemic Normativity and the Justification-Excuse Distinction 
 
0. Introduction 
 
The distinction between justifications and excuses is a popular topic in contemporary 
epistemology. It figures prominently in debates about norms of belief, assertion and 
practical reason, and debates about radically deceived subjects. Why is this? Here is one 
explanation, due to Littlejohn: 
 
If we had a better understanding of the difference between justificatory and 
excusatory defenses, we’d have a better understanding of the significance of the 
intuitions that shape the internalism-externalism debate (Littlejohn forthcoming, 
p.1). 
 
Littlejohn’s claim gets at a central point of interest. Excuses help (some) externalists 
account for and explain away intuitions that pose problems for their views about 
justification. For example, excuses help explain away intuitions that certain cases of non-
criticizable or blameless Φ-ing are cases of justified Φ-ing.1 When it comes to evaluating 
belief, here are two important cases: 
 
GETTIER: Ed comes downstairs in the morning and checks the time. He checks 
a clock that he knows to be generally reliable. However, the clock happened to 
stop exactly twenty-four hours ago. He forms the perfectly blameless and true 
belief that it is 8am. But Ed does not know that it is 8am. 
BRAIN IN A VAT (BIV): Dave has recently been envatted and hooked up to an 
experience machine. He is the internal duplicate of an ordinary, epistemically 
blameless person. He continues to believe he has hands because it looks to him 
just like he has hands. But Dave does not know that he has hands. 
According to externalists who understand epistemic justification in terms of a knowledge 
norm of belief, for example, these agents violate the norm of belief and do not count as 
justified. According to many, there is a tension between this result and Ed and Dave’s 
blamelessness. But in addition to epistemic justifications, there are epistemic excuses, 
and there is room to understand cases like GETTIER and BIV as cases of agents having 
an excuse as opposed to a justification. This way, proponents of the knowledge norm 
argue there is no tension between withholding attributions of justified belief and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Of course, problems for externalists in this area are not restricted to intuitions about cases. There are also 
theoretical considerations that augment such intuitions. It is also worth noting that the tendency to treat 
blamelessness as central to justification is found predominantly in epistemological internalists who 
understand justified belief in deontological terms, such as believing in accordance with epistemic duties, 
permissions, or obligations.  
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acknowledging Ed and Dave’s blamelessness. According to Littlejohn, this is a big part 
of the “better understanding of the significance of the intuitions that shape the 
internalism-externalism debate.” It is important, then, to get clear on what makes this 
understanding better. Is it because it latches onto an independently motivated conception 
of the structure of epistemic normativity? Or is it because such an understanding puts 
certain externalists in the clear on some problematic cases?  
 
The qualification “certain externalists” is important. Indeed, GETTIER and BIV are often 
considered cases of justified belief by both internalists and externalists such as Goldman 
(1979), Dretske (1981), Burge (2003), and Graham (2012). Littlejohn’s point is that 
excuses are important when it comes to defending a particularly strong form of 
externalism—namely, one that understands justified belief in terms of compliance with a 
factive norm. I will not be getting into the question of whether strong externalism is 
unnecessarily strong. Instead, I will be examining an important issue for such a view, and 
arguing that strong externalism has a lot going for it vis-à-vis this issue.2 
 
In recent work, Williamson (forthcoming) and Littlejohn (forthcoming) have each 
developed their own frameworks according to which certain appeals to excuses (in 
defense of various externalist theses) come out looking principled and well motivated. In 
other words, they provide accounts of how the justification-excuse distinction fits into an 
independently motivated conception of the structure of epistemic normativity. Given the 
importance of this issue in debates about epistemic norms, and the internalism-
externalism debate generally, these recent developments deserve careful attention. 
 
In this paper, I center discussion largely on a key idea in Williamson’s framework. 
Williamson understands excuses in terms of the positive standing that comes from acting 
in a way that someone who is disposed to comply with a given norm would act. As I 
explain, this idea is interesting because it appears to offer resources for dealing with 
Gerken’s (2011) influential claim that the “excuse maneuver” is ad hoc. That said, I 
formulate and examine an additional objection to the so-called excuse maneuver. I call it 
the “excuses are not enough” objection. Dealing with this objection generates pressure in 
two directions: one is to show that excuses are a positive enough normative standing to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Strong externalism has a variety of prominent proponents, such as Adler (2002), Huemer (2007), 
Littlejohn (2012), Sutton (2005), and Williamson (2000; 2013). It is also worth noting that everyone needs 
to make at least some kind of distinction when it comes to cases like GETTIER and BIV and ordinary or 
“good” cases of well-formed belief. For example, consider Goldman’s distinction between “strong” and 
“weak” justification (Goldman 1988). This paper examines and ultimately defends the strong externalist 
approach of drawing such a distinction in terms of justifications and excuses. Although I won’t argue as 
much, the view I develop in this paper may provide resources for any theory of justification that struggles 
with cases like GETTIER and BIV. For instance, rather than resorting to actual worlds reliabilism, normal 
worlds reliabilism, distinctions between strong and weak justification, and so on, proponents of various 
theories may simply want to apply the justification-excuse distinction in such cases, in support of their 
theory of justification. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer and [removed] for suggestions along these lines.   
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help strong externalists with cases like GETTIER and BIV; the other is to do so in a way 
that does not lead back to Gerken’s initial objection. In a final section, I put forward a 
positive proposal. Perhaps surprisingly, the proposal draws on recent virtue 
epistemology. The basic idea is that epistemic excuses (as opposed to justifications) 
should be understood in terms of the manifestation of certain cognitive abilities or 
competences. The result is a view about the nature of epistemic excuses that can deal 
with both sources of pressure. 
 
1. Gerken on Primary and Secondary Propriety  
 
In an early discussion of the norm of assertion, DeRose (2002) defends a knowledge 
norm of assertion against the worry that it delivers the wrong results in certain cases of 
blameless assertions. He appeals to a distinction between two senses of propriety. 
Primary propriety requires compliance with a norm. Secondary propriety requires 
something less. In particular, it requires that an agent reasonably believe they comply 
with the relevant norm.  
 
As a way of understanding the justification-excuse distinction, the idea would be that 
agents who meet the requirements of primary propriety are justified. Agents who merely 
meet the requirements of secondary propriety have an excuse. It’s because they meet 
these requirements that they count as having an excuse for failing to meet the 
requirements of primary propriety. That is to say, the fact that they reasonably believe 
themselves to comply with the relevant norm means they deserve an excuse for Φ-ing, 
even though they are not justified in Φ-ing.3 This provides DeRose with resources for 
explaining away intuitions that certain cases of non-criticizable or blameless Φ-ing are 
cases of justified Φ-ing. 
 
Gerken (2011) is not convinced. Transposing to the debate about the so-called norm of 
action, he argues that proponents of a knowledge norm of action make an analogous 
“excuse maneuver.”4 He argues that the maneuver fails to apply to a subset of the cases 
that are counterexamples to the knowledge norm. In particular, he claims that there are 
cases of agents who fail to comply with the knowledge norm, are not criticizable, and 
who are incapable of meeting the requirements of secondary propriety. Gerken’s main 
claim is that secondary propriety places implausible demands on the conceptual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 DeRose (2002) does not explicitly link secondary propriety to excuse. He simply talks about secondary 
propriety (and for an interestingly short period of time, given that he is heavily cited for it). Lackey (2007), 
who challenges secondary propriety, does not seem to think of it as being explicitly connected to excuse 
either. Indeed, she appeals to excuses as part of her argument against DeRose’s distinction. Meanwhile, 
Gerken (2007) and Littlejohn (forthcoming) both see tight connections between secondary propriety and 
excuse.  
4 One reason to think that there is some structural symmetry here is assertion is an act (a speech act). See 
Gerken (2012). To be sure, the relationship between norms of action and norm of assertion is debated. 
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capacities of agents in these cases. Since they do not meet the requirements of secondary 
propriety, Gerken argues, the only reason to attribute excuses to them (so far as we have 
been told) is to save the knowledge norm.  
 
The point is not that there are cases in which non-complying but non-criticizable agents 
simply happen not to reasonably believe themselves to comply with the relevant norm. 
Rather, Gerken appeals to cases in which the agent is incapable of having the relevant 
higher-order thought. Consider cases of small children, or perhaps cases of higher 
animals like chimpanzees. It is easy to imagine a young enough child mistakenly but non-
criticizably acting on the belief that there is an apple on the table in front of them (say, 
when what they see is a realistic fake). Small children arguably do not have the 
conceptual capacities for entertaining the thought: “I know there is an apple on the 
table.”5 If that is the case, they cannot meet the requirements of secondary propriety. That 
is, they cannot reasonably take themselves to comply with a knowledge norm of action. 
So the notion of secondary propriety does not help explain blameless norm violation in 
this sort of case. In other words, as far as DeRose’s notion of secondary propriety tells us, 
we do not have a principled reason merely to excuse the agents in the cases. According to 
Gerken, the excuse maneuver seems ad hoc.   
 
A natural response is to weaken the requirements of secondary propriety. For example, 
rather than demanding that the agent have some sort of doxastic justification for the belief 
that they comply with the knowledge norm (i.e. “reasonably believe”), we might demand 
that they have propositional justification with respect to the proposition: “I know that p”. 
Gerken provides compelling reasons to think that such a move is dialectically ineffective. 
That is, making such a move ultimately renders it unclear why an agent who enjoys this 
kind of propositional justification vis-à-vis the proposition that they comply with the 
knowledge norm deserves an excuse. An excuse is usually something we attribute to an 
agent because they have done something commendable despite their unfortunate 
circumstances. Propositional justification just doesn’t have enough to do with the agent to 
ground the sort of merit we usually confer on someone by excusing them. I’ll return to 
this relationship between merits of the agent and excuses below.  
 
Gerken’s objection to DeRose’s appeal to secondary propriety as a way of responding to 
objections from blameless norm violation looks compelling.6 But it raises some important 
questions. Moreover, the primary-secondary propriety distinction is not the only 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Gerken appeals to the so-called “false belief test”. He claims that a good explanation of the fact that small 
children fail the false belief test is that they lack the concept of belief. Interesting questions aside as to 
whether children may acquire the concept of knowledge before that of belief, he takes this as evidence in 
support of the claim that such children lack the higher-order ability to take themselves to enjoy other 
epistemic states, like knowledge, with respect to a proposition p.  
6 There may of course be other responses to Gerken’s objection. In what follows, I am interested in 
Williamson’s view because it appears to avoid the objection altogether.  
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framework available for constructing a principled theory of excuses in epistemology. For 
example, Williamson (forthcoming) has a different framework, and it inspires a way to 
avoid Gerken’s objection. As we will see, it also facilitates discussion of some more 
general issues with Gerken’s objection. 
2. Derivative Norms Framework  
 
Williamson takes a step back from epistemology and makes some general normative 
distinctions. The idea is to return to epistemology with those independently motivated 
distinctions in hand. He starts by claiming that, “a given norm typically generates various 
derivative norms” (Williamson forthcoming, p. 6). More specifically, he claims that there 
are two types of norm that derive from a given norm, “N”. The first of these requires an 
agent to be the kind of person who is disposed to comply with N (call this “DN”). The 
basic idea is intuitive enough. As Williamson puts it with respect to a norm of keeping 
one’s promises, “[i]f it is bad not to keep a promise, then there is also something bad 
about not being generally disposed to keep one’s promises […]” (Williamson 
forthcoming, p.9). It is important to note, however, that the normative force of this sort of 
derivative norm is in some sense weaker than the norm from which it derives. We can 
illustrate with legal norms. For example, if one fails to comply with a legal norm N, one 
breaks the law. But failing to comply with the derivative norm telling you to be the sort 
of person who is normally disposed to comply with N does not amount to breaking the 
law.7 As Williamson puts it, “…[F]or accidental reasons, one might still never break the 
law, at least in a non-totalitarian state where lacking a law-abiding disposition is not itself 
illegal” (Williamson, forthcoming, p. 6)).  
 
The second of Williamson’s derivative norms requires agents to do what a person who is 
disposed to comply with N would do under the relevant circumstances (call this “ODN”, 
where “O” stands for “occurrent”). Continuing with the promise-keeping example, 
Williamson suggests that if there is something bad about not being generally disposed to 
keep one’s promises, then there is also “something bad about not doing what someone so 
disposed would do” (Williamson forthcoming, p.9). Again, taking into account 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Note that whatever kind of norm this derivative norm is, it is certainly not a legal norm. Perhaps this is 
Williamson’s point. But one might also ask the following question. Does the fact that this so-called 
“derivative norm” fails even to belong to the same normative domain as the primary norm undermine the 
idea that it derives from the primary norm? I am not entirely sure. But here is one way of understanding 
“derivative” which seems to avoid the worry. The idea is to understand “derivative” in terms of an 
explanatory connection. That is, a given norm derives from a norm N in the sense that the positive status 
associated with compliance with it is to be explained in terms of the positive status associated with 
compliance with N. On this approach, the fact that it is good to be a law-abiding person—though not 
necessary for compliance with the law itself—is nonetheless explained in terms of the fact that it is good 
not to break the law. I’ll set further discussion of this question to one side here.  
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Williamson’s claim that these derivate norms do not have the same normative force as the 
norms that generate them, this seems intuitive enough.8 
 
From the basic idea that norms governing our actions and attitudes imply secondary and 
tertiary norms pertaining to the types of people we ought to be, or act like, Williamson 
claims to be able to provide a well-motivated account of the justification-excuse 
distinction. In particular, agents have excuses for violating a given norm N when they fail 
to comply with N but comply with ODN. And they have much better excuses when, 
despite failing to comply with N, they comply with ODN and DN (more on this next 
section). That is, when agents act as agents who are disposed to comply with the relevant 
norm, they have an excuse for failing to comply with that norm. And, they have an even 
better excuse when, in addition to that, they are someone who is disposed to comply with 
the relevant norm. The reason compliance with ODN and DN cannot give one the full 
normative status of justification when one violates N is because the normative status of so 
doing is itself merely derivative from N. Justification requires compliance with N. 
Concerning problematic cases for strong externalists about the norm of belief like 
GETTIER and BIV, for example, Williamson’s framework allows strong externalists to 
reserve the normative status of justification for agents who comply with N, while 
attributing a derivative normative status that accounts for the intuition that the agent is  
completely blameless or non-criticizable. For example, while the BIV does not know he 
has hands, and therefore violates the knowledge norm of belief, he does act just like 
someone normally disposed to comply with the norm of belief. So, on the Derivative 
Norms Framework, he deserves an excuse.  
 
Importantly, Williamson has resources for avoiding Gerken’s objection to the primary-
secondary propriety distinction.9 He has resources in at least two different ways. Firstly, 
Williamson does not use the framework to provide a set of necessary conditions on 
excuses.10 As such, challenging the framework in the way that Gerken challenges 
DeRose—by way of a counterexample—would seem to be misguided. Of course, Gerken 
might insist that if the framework does not offer a set of necessary conditions on excuse, 
it cannot help with the basic problem afflicting the excuse maneuver in the first place. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It is not hard to imagine someone taking issue with these sweeping claims about the existence of norms 
such as DN and ODN. But this is one reason why it is important to keep in mind that they are relatively 
weak norms. Moreover, I think it is fair to approach these claims in a somewhat loose or deflationary way, 
and I can do so without compromising the overall argument of this paper. I regard what Williamson is 
doing here less as making robust theoretical claims than as offering a codified way of articulating the sorts 
of evaluations ordinary people find natural to make, and then drawing some fruitful conclusions.  
9 To be clear, Williamson does not himself address Gerken’s objection to DeRose. I am simply taking 
Williamson’s view and applying it to Gerken’s objection.  
10 Williamson points out in a footnote: “I am not suggesting that all excuses are of the kind described. That 
one was distraught with grief is an excuse of a quite different kind. Excuses are inexhaustibly various; one 
should not expect a neat taxonomy” (fn. 6). Littlejohn (forthcoming) is also sensitive to the idea that 
excuses are a “motley bunch”. 
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The idea would be that this is a minimal condition on providing a general theory with 
which to classify specific cases. This may or may not be a reasonable demand. The issue 
is complicated, and I return to it below. For now, note, secondly, that even if 
Williamson’s framework were a story about what is necessary and/or sufficient for 
deserving an excuse, it inspires a way to avoid Gerken’s objection. This is because it 
classifies cases as cases of excuse without appealing to the higher-order thoughts that are 
the target of Gerken’s objection. Instead of making claims about agents reasonably 
believing themselves to comply with a norm, the framework employs the notion of 
derivative norms governing agents’ characters or dispositions. I think this is its key 
insight—the shift from a focus on reasonable belief to a focus on the dispositions of 
agents to act or be like agents who are disposed to comply with the primary norm of a 
given domain. Small children seem capable of complying with ODN. Thus, this insight 
provides a way to advance the debate beyond Gerken’s objection.11  
3. Excuse as a Positive Normative Standing 
 
All of this said, there is an important further objection to consider. A further objection is 
that the strong externalist’s appeal to excuses is unsatisfying in a different way. 
“Deserving an excuse” is just too weak or negative sounding as a defense of agents in the 
important cases. For example, the BIV enjoys something more than a mere excuse for 
believing as he does. After all, the thought goes, he has done everything right from his 
first person perspective, behaved with impeccable epistemic responsibility, etc.12 Call this 
the “excuses are not enough” objection, or ENE for short.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 An anonymous referee points out another potential advantage of this shift. It arises in the context of a 
question about the specific kind of criticism excuses address. When we hold agents responsible for 
wrongdoing, a prominent view is that we hold them responsible for not showing de re concern for what is 
of normative significance. That is, we hold them responsible for not showing the right concern for what is 
in fact normatively significant, as opposed to what they take to be normatively significant, as such. A 
prominent source of motivation for this view is the fetishism charge directed against externalist accounts of 
moral motivation (Arpaly 2002). The plausibility of this position may further support the shift away from 
DeRose’s approach. That is, it seems to speak against understanding excuses in terms of what agents 
reasonably believe, since doing so seems to go hand in hand with a de dicto reading of what makes an 
agent responsible for Φ-ing in the first place (since it seems to understand excuse from wrongdoing in 
terms of what the agent takes to be normatively significant). Meanwhile, on the approach I’ll be 
advocating, we excuse agents for doing what the person normally disposed to comply with N does. The 
thought is that this fits better with a de re reading of what makes an agent responsible for Φ-ing in the first 
place. After all, we are talking directly in terms of a primary norm N, and spelling out excuses in terms of 
compliance with norms that derive from it. Thanks to the anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
12 What the BIV does right is not limited to meeting internalist conditions. The BIV also meets various 
more traditional externalist conditions, such as forming beliefs in a way that would have been objectively 
truth-conducive in the BIV’s normal environment. As such, the issue need not merely be about epistemic 
responsibility. Those sympathetic to a normal worlds reliabilist way of spelling out objective truth-
conducive belief formation will have further things to say about the “excuses are not enough” objection.  
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To get a sense of the idea that there is something negative or inferior about excuses as 
opposed to justifications, consider what Marcia Baron (2005) says about the comparative 
value of moral excuses and justifications:  
 
That justifications and excuses are not on a par, morally, is uncontroversial. One 
does not want to be excused unless an excuse is called for (or unless the only 
alternative is to be punished). For example, if a colleague says to me, ‘Of course 
we could hardly have expected you to do X, when you had just given birth a few 
weeks earlier, so no one blames you,’ and I believe that in fact it was not my job 
to do X, period, I will not be entirely happy to be told that I am excused. I will 
be tempted to set the record straight: X was someone else’s responsibility, not 
mine. I did nothing wrong at all (Baron 2005, p.390). 
 
There are of course important differences between Baron’s example and the BIV. For one 
thing, by stipulation, the BIV does something wrong. He forms systematically false 
beliefs. But when the externalist tells us that the BIV has an excuse for believing falsely 
(or without knowledge), ENE says that this is unsatisfying, if not for the same reason as 
in Baron’s example, then for something very similar.13 
 
This is a reiteration of the objection to strong externalism in the background of our 
general discussion. Namely, it is a reiteration of the objection from cases of blameless or 
non-criticizable norm violation. Above, I said the strong externalist needs to explain 
away intuitions that certain cases of non-criticizable or blameless Φ-ing are cases of 
justified Φ-ing. ENE effectively adds that a good response to this objection must identify 
a standing that falls short of “justified” but that still seems positive enough to account for 
our positive reaction to these cases.  
 
On the face of it, as should already be clear, the Derivative Norms Framework has 
resources for dealing with this objection, too. By connecting excuses to derivative norms, 
compliance with which reflects a kind of creditworthiness or praiseworthiness, it explains 
why certain agents deserve excuses in a way that highlights how excuses can be a much 
more positive or credit-implying sort of defense than one might have thought. Indeed, 
Williamson claims that all the standard commendable things usually said about the BIV 
can be understood in terms of compliance with ODN (Williamson forthcoming, p.18). 
The aim of casting excuses in a more positive light also shows up (in an even more 
pronounced way) in Littlejohn’s recent work on excuses. For example, Littlejohn says 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The appeal to Baron here is not intended to suggest that she would agree with the approach to excuses 
advocated in this paper. Baron endorses the Kantian idea that all genuinely normative appraisal focuses on 
the quality of the agent’s will, and the way it is exercised. As such she would take issue with the appeal to 
excuses as a way of promoting strong externalism in epistemology. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
pressing this point.  
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things like, “…rationality is quite often a sign of excuse, not justification” (Littlejohn 
forthcoming, p.21 italics in original).14 
 
But things are a bit more complicated than this. Someone sympathetic to ENE can 
respond to this line of thought in the following sort of way. They can argue that 
explaining why the BIV deserves an excuse in terms of the BIV’s compliance with ODN 
is not enough to account for ENE. The problem is that compliance with ODN is the sort 
of thing that can happen by chance. One can merely happen to act as a person normally 
disposed to comply with N would have in a given situation. To see why this is 
problematic in the present context, consider the following scenario. Imagine that Bill has 
promised to give you some money. Unbeknownst to Bill, you and Mary are perfectly 
disguised as one another. Bill gives Mary the money, thinking she is you. Bill violates N 
(“keep your promises”), but does what a person normally disposed to comply with N 
would do (thus, complies with ODN). However, imagine that in this situation Bill simply 
gives Mary the money because it suits him. Irrespectively of the promise, that is just what 
Bill happens to feel like doing.15 He complies with ODN, but in such a way that seems 
irrelevant to the question of whether he deserves any positive sort of standing for doing 
so. Presumably this is because the fact that Bill complies with ODN—while that may 
itself be a good thing—has nothing to do with Bill’s dispositions vis-à-vis the norm of 
promise keeping. Bill merely happens to comply with ODN because that particular 
course of action suits him.16  
 
To explain why deserving an excuse can be a positive enough normative standing, it 
looks like we need to talk about more than mere compliance with ODN. For example, we 
might focus on DN in addition to ODN. To see how this might help, imagine that in a 
given situation Bill does what a person normally disposed to comply with N would have 
done. Moreover, imagine that Bill is that kind of person, and perhaps even does what he 
does because he is that kind of person. This would seem to be a highly positive sort of 
thing. Indeed, as I have noted, Williamson himself says that “compliance with ODN is 
usually a much better excuse for violating N if one also complies with DN” (p.10). So, 
perhaps this is a way of dealing with ENE.  
 
We should note right away that compliance with DN is obviously not always what is 
involved in deserving an excuse. For one thing, this is because compliance with DN is a 
diachronic matter. Whether one complies with a norm telling one to be a kind of person 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Littlejohn continues: “It is a sign of excuse because an excuse would often be out of order if the agent's 
actions and attitudes weren't rational responses to the apparent reasons, responses that showed the subject 
to be an excellent processor of reasons, albeit an imperfect detector of them” (Littlejohn forthcoming, p.21).  
15 This is an adaption of an example Williamson uses in a different context. 
16 The point is similar to Gerken’s critique of appealing to mere propositional justification in a weakened 
version of the requirements of secondary propriety (see Section One). 
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is not a matter that can be settled synchronically, by considering a particular time-slice of 
that person. Being a kind of person is a temporal matter. For example, it seems to involve 
highly stable dispositions to behave in certain ways. So, if compliance with DN requires 
one to be a kind of person, that means one only complies with DN if one has had the 
relevant characteristics at to-be-specified times t1, t2…tn in the past, and will have the 
relevant characteristics at to-be-specified times t1 and t2…tn in the future. There are 
cases of agents deserving an excuse who do not meet these requirements. For example, 
imagine a person who has just begun being a lot like a promise keeper without yet fully 
counting as one. Imagine they are a reforming promise breaker, say. Surely this person 
could be excused for violating the promise keeping norm when, for example, they do just 
what the promise keeper would have done in a given situation, yet violate the norm of 
promise keeping.  
 
Of course, given that Williamson is not offering a set of necessary conditions on excuses, 
he may or may not find these observations problematic. However, the issue of whether 
we ought to provide necessary conditions on excuse is something I would like to remain 
as neutral as possible on. So, it is important to point out the following. The more cases we 
consider, the more it looks like the appeal to dispositions of agents handles particularly 
problematic cases (the ones that opponents of strong externalism are interested in) in a 
way that is quite specific to those cases. For example, we have just seen that the 
Derivative Norms Framework (modified so that it makes a central role for DN) does not 
apply to the reforming promise breaker. And insofar as that is because of diachronic 
considerations, we might think the approach is equally inapplicable to Gerken’s small 
children (more on this below). The approach seems even less applicable to well-known 
cases such as the brainwashed person, or the recent stroke victim.17 None of these agents 
are in the market for compliance with anything like DN. And yet, many will find it 
plausible to think of them as agents who are at least in the market for an excuse in a given 
situation.18  
 
So, something like Gerken’s ad hocery objection continues to loom in the background. 
To put it one way, we still face pressure in two competing directions. On one hand, there 
is pressure to demonstrate that excuses are a positive enough normative standing. And on 
this score, there is a case to be made that appealing to mere compliance with ODN is not 
enough. But once we add further features to our explanation of why at least some excuses 
count as a positive enough standing—for example, because of compliance with DN as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Examples of appeals these sorts of cases can be found in Bonjour (2002), Cohen and Comesaña (2013), 
Lackey (2007), Madison (2014). 
18 Of course, we can also do what Littlejohn does and draw a further distinction between excuses and 
exemptions in order to classify some of these cases in a principled way. I return to this feature of 
Littlejohn’s approach below (fn. 25). However, even with that distinction on the table, it is not clear where 
to fit the reforming promise breaker or the case of small children. This is because it is not clear that these 
are cases of exemption.  
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well—we see that this sort of explanation applies in a very limited range of cases. Indeed, 
it seems specific to the sort of case that opponents of strong externalism are inclined to 
classify as a case of justification. If that is right, then the strong externalist plea for 
excuses is starting to look ad hoc all over again. We are still some distance from settling 
the issue by showing how excuses are a natural way to defend agents in the contested 
cases in light of a general, principled framework.19 
 
All of this said, in the next section I want to offer a potential way forward. An alternative 
approach to dealing with ENE is to simply beef up what is involved in complying with 
ODN. The idea is to build into the notion of compliance with ODN—that is, compliance 
with a norm that tells agents to do what a person normally disposed to comply with N 
would do—that this is the sort of thing that does not happen accidentally. I will argue that 
we can thereby deal with ENE while explaining a satisfying range of cases. I will look at 
a way of fleshing this out that draws on two different forms of virtue epistemology.20  
 
4. Excuses, Responsibility, and Competence 
Let’s restrict discussion to the epistemic norm N that says, “One epistemically ought to 
believe that p if and only if one knows that p.” The derivative norm ODN, then, says that 
one ought to do what the kind of person who is normally disposed to believe that p if and 
only if they know that p would do in a given situation. One natural idea is to think of the 
contents of ODN as involving the sort of character traits that responsibilist virtue 
epistemologists are interested in. I have in mind traits such as conscientiousness, open-
mindedness and the like (Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011). For example, “be conscientious”, 
or “be open-minded” are plausible (albeit rough) ways of understanding the contents of a 
norm that tells you to do what the sort of person who is disposed to comply with our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Perhaps one way of dealing with both sources of pressure is simply to find some normative standing 
other than justification or excuse. But I find it difficult to think of what such a status might be. Indeed, one 
significant advantage of the appeal to excuses is that this is already a very familiar normative notion. Still, 
identifying another normative standing altogether may be a strategy worth considering on another occasion. 
Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
20 An anonymous referee asks why—since I shift to virtue epistemology—I do not simply drop 
Williamson’s terminology (“ODN”) and focus on the virtues in what follows. There are three reasons. i) 
When I say “compliance with ODN” I simply mean, “doing what a person who is normally disposed to 
comply with N would do” (though I do develop a somewhat technical way of understanding this notion), 
but I also thereby emphasize the idea that this has some kind of positive normative status which is 
derivative from a primary norm determining justification. ii) Talking about excuses in terms of 
“compliance with ODN” fits nicely with my preferred picture on which justification is a matter of 
compliance with the norm of belief. This in turn helps me remain within a framework that can easily be 
applied to the epistemic norms debate, where the justification-excuse distinction is prominently debated in 
epistemology. I also think it jibes well with the way people think about justified Φ-ing in real life, or at 
least when it comes to the law. That is to say, justified Φ-ing in the eyes of the law is primarily a matter of 
complying with the law itself, not, for example, what one reasonably believes about the law (or one’s 
actions), or the kinds of dispositional matters discussed in the present framework; these are claims I won’t 
defend here. iii) The phrase “compliance with ODN” remains stylistically helpful.    
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epistemic norm would do in a given situation. Moreover, it builds in a condition of non-
accidentality in a helpful way. This is because, as most—if not all—responsibilist virtue 
epistemologists agree, the intellectual virtues come with a motivational component. Very 
roughly, a character trait counts as an intellectual virtue only if it manifests the agent’s 
motivation to achieve some sort of cognitive value (such as truth, or knowledge), in 
addition to being reliably successful at doing so (Zagzebski 1996; Baehr 2011; Greco 
2000). If that is right, then one cannot merely happen to comply with ODN. One must 
also be motivated in the right sort of way. Since acting like a virtuous person on a 
specific occasion—for example, displaying a genuine bit of open-mindedness—is 
something someone who is not generally open-minded may be capable of doing, this is a 
promising alternative to requiring full-fledged compliance with DN in explaining how 
deserving an excuse is a positive (enough) normative standing.21   
 
For those sceptical of responsibilism, note that there are promising resources in other 
forms of virtue epistemology as well. For example, we might say that compliance with 
ODN sometimes merely requires manifesting the kind of dispositions focused on by 
reliabilist virtue epistemologists, insofar as they make claims about “abilities” or 
“competences” necessary for knowledge, for example (Greco 2010; Sosa 2011; Pritchard 
2012; Kelp 2013). These are innate dispositions to believe truly or to know (such as 
having good eyesight, or a good memory).22 23 Doing what the kind of person who is 
disposed to comply with our epistemic norm N would do in a given situation, then, need 
merely be a matter of manifesting a certain set of innate abilities or competences to 
believe in accordance with that norm. When one manifests such abilities, despite failing 
to comply with our epistemic norm, one may be excused for so failing.  
 
This proposal avoids the issue of accidental compliance with ODN, not because of any 
sort of motivational component, but rather because innate cognitive abilities or 
competences are a kind of stable disposition to get things right. If compliance with ODN 
amounts to manifesting a stable disposition to comply with N, then compliance with 
ODN is not the sort of thing that happens by accident. This looks like a way of explaining 
why (at least some of) the BIV’s and GETTIER victim’s beliefs are excusable (for 
example, their basic perceptual beliefs). But interestingly, it likewise looks like a way of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 A question remains about the degree to which a generally non-open-minded person is capable of 
satisfying the motivational component of the intellectual virtues on a specific occasion. 
22 Greco (1992): “Examples of human intellectual virtues are sight, hearing, introspection, memory, 
deduction and induction” (p.520).  
23 Recently, a number of epistemologists have developed “knowledge-first” forms of virtue epistemology. 
According to knowledge-first epistemologists, the goal or aim of a cognitive ability is knowledge rather 
than true belief (Kelp forthcoming; Miracchi 2014). 
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approaching the agents in Gerken’s cases.24 After all, it is not implausible to think of 
small children as having such innate cognitive abilities. 
 
In sum, I think we can explain what it is for agents to deserve an excuse in cases like 
GETTIER and BIV in terms of mere compliance with ODN. I claim that compliance with 
ODN requires manifesting cognitive virtues. Whether we focus on innate reliabilist 
abilities or competences, or acquired responsibilist virtues, depends on the specific 
belief(s) or behaviors of the BIV that are in question. Importantly, however, at a minimal 
level, compliance with ODN always requires the manifestation of innate cognitive 
abilities or competences. To this extent, our explanation extends across an interesting 
range of cases. That is to say, it explains why the BIV deserves an excuse, but it also 
explains why Gerken’s small children deserve an excuse, as well as epistemic analogues 
of the reforming promise breaker (more in moment about the fact that the proposal does 
not intelligibly seem to extend to the reforming promise breaker himself). And since 
manifesting such cognitive abilities is a commendable or positive thing, we also account 
for ENE. In other words, we can explain why deserving an excuse is a positive enough 
normative standing in an interesting range of cases (i.e. in a principled way). To 
emphasize, the proposal does this by beefing up what is involved in compliance with 
ODN, as opposed to focusing on DN. It thereby avoids the problems of focusing on a 
norm that requires an agent to be a particular kind of person; but it is capable of dealing 
with the worries about chance compliance with ODN that motivated focusing on DN in 
the first place. I will briefly consider a couple of objections before concluding.  
 
One objection is that it is not clear why this proposal does not run into the objection I put 
forward earlier to giving compliance with DN an important role in our theory of excuses. 
After all, we have discovered that an important feature of “virtue” talk is the appeal to 
stable dispositions. In other words, invoking abilities or competences in an account of 
what is involved in compliance with ODN seems automatically to entail compliance with 
DN. So, it seems that by understanding what it takes, for example, for the BIV to have an 
excuse in terms of compliance with ODN, we are still committed to claiming that the BIV 
must be a particular kind of person. As the argument above showed, this sort of 
explanation of what goes on when an agent deserves an excuse is disconcertingly limited. 
 
Here is a response. Requiring that an agent satisfy certain global or general conditions on 
their innate cognitive abilities or competences does not unduly or problematically limit an 
account of epistemic excuse. For an agent to deserve an epistemic excuse in any given 
situation, it is plausible that they do need to have dispositions in the way implied by the 
notion of cognitive abilities or competences. In other words, the kind of person we are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 To be sure, Gerken uses his cases in a discussion of the knowledge norm of action. But I take translation 
into a discussion of the knowledge norm of belief to be straightforward in the present context. 
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committed to claiming the BIV must be, in order to be in the market for deserving an 
excuse, is a minimal enough sort of thing that it features (at least partially, and perhaps 
implicitly) in a quite general sort of explanation of why agents deserve epistemic 
excuses.25  
 
Another objection, however, is that this merely highlights a deeper worry for the present 
proposal. Notice that framing a theory of excuses within a reliabilist framework seems to 
render the theory quite specific to epistemology. It is difficult to imagine moral analogues 
of reliabilist virtues. Indeed, some epistemologists have claimed that reliabilist virtue 
epistemology is about virtues in a rather nominal sense.26 But if that is right, then, while 
the framework we have ended up with may provide the most general sort of explanation 
of epistemic excuses, the appeal to excuses in epistemology no longer seems to fall out of 
a general explanation of the justification-excuse distinction spanning both ethics and 
epistemology. Perhaps this is asking too much in the first place (more on this right away). 
However, it might seem unfortunate given that the Derivative Norms Framework’s ability 
to provide such a general explanation, which is then applicable to epistemology, is one of 
its most interesting features.27 
 
I have two things to say in response. First, recall that we have resources from both 
reliabilist and responsibilist virtue epistemology. While it is a minimal condition on 
deserving an excuse in the epistemic domain that one is generally reliable, it is also often 
going to be the case that one deserves an epistemic excuse because one exhibits some 
responsibilist virtue or another. To this extent, the Derivative Norms Framework will 
often be extendable to moral analogues of epistemic cases. To be sure, there may be some 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Littlejohn contrasts excuse with exemption in terms that are relevantly similar here (Littlejohn 
forthcoming, p.10). To roughly summarize, his main claim in motivating the distinction between 
exemptions and excuses is that excuses are normative standings that require agents to be reasons-
responsive in such a way that they can be held accountable for what they do in general (Littlejohn 
forthcoming, p.11). When an agent is excused with respect to the violation of some norm, this is in part 
because they have the relevant capacities needed for being held accountable—it is just that certain other 
circumstances mitigate blame (for example, non-culpable ignorance, or lack of control). Meanwhile, this is 
not the case when we exempt someone. Agents exempt with respect to some norm are not reasons-
responsive such that they can be held accountable for what they do in general. To put it metaphorically, 
they are not in the market for accountability, in a global sort of way.   
26 Zagzebski (1996) discusses this point in detail. For example, picking on Greco, but referring to a feature 
of his view shared by Sosa and other reliabilist virtue epistemologists, she says: “The sense in which 
Greco’s examples can be considered virtues […] is misapplied if it is intended to reflect the way the 
concept of virtue has been used in ethics. In fact, it has little connection with the history of the concept of 
intellectual virtue, although that history is quite sparse […]. Aristotle’s examples of intellectual virtues 
include theoretical wisdom (sophia), practical wisdom (phronesis), and understanding or insight (nous). 
Hobbes’s list includes good wit and discretion; Spinoza’s primary intellectual virtue is understanding. […]. 
None of these qualities are faculties like sight or hearing” (Zagzebski 1996, p.11). I do not think the matter 
is so simple. I will have more to say about this below. 
27 Consider again, and to quote Williamson: “This essay steps back from the epistemological issues to make 
some of those general normative distinctions, then returns with them to epistemology” (p.3).  
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cases in which the explanation is unique to epistemology (perhaps Gerken’s small 
children case is an example). However, I will simply bite the bullet here. We should not 
expect a complete symmetry between the domain of epistemic normativity and any other 
domain of normativity.  
 
Now, one might object that bringing responsibilism back into the picture at this point 
raises the ad hocery worry all over again. The second thing I want to say here, then, is 
that I don’t think it should. To see why, consider that while reliabilist and responsibilist 
epistemology are, on the face of it, very different approaches to epistemology, the 
differences should not be exaggerated. Indeed, an appeal to one goes naturally with an 
appeal to the other. Let me explain.28 
 
According to Jason Baehr, “the very distinction between virtue reliabilism and virtue 
responsibilism is considerably more sketchy than it initially appears” (IEP, “Virtue 
Epistemology”). For instance, Baehr claims that while reliabilist virtue theory is 
primarily interested in truth conduciveness—thus making good sense of its focus on 
cognitive faculties like vision and memory—it must be noted that our epistemic goals in 
actual human life (goals such as scientific discoveries, for example) require more than the 
reliable functioning of cognitive faculties like vision and memory. They seem to require 
certain virtuous character traits, like open-mindedness, intellectual courage, and the like 
(one might disagree about whether this is necessarily true; but as a matter of contingent 
fact, such traits certainly don’t seem to hurt the progress of science). Baehr claims:  
 
[T]he most plausible version of virtue reliabilism will incorporate many 
[responsibilist] traits into its repertoire of virtues and in doing so will go 
significant lengths toward bridging the gap between virtue reliabilism and virtue 
responsibilism (IEP, “Virtue Epistemology”). 
 
Getting into the precise details of what Baehr has in mind would take us too far afield. 
But note that some of the most prominent virtue reliabilists seem to agree with the 
general idea. For example, here is Sosa stating the primary aim of his (2015) Judgment 
and Agency: “I will offer a better responsibilist account, one that welcomes 
responsibilism at the core of virtue reliabilism” (Sosa 2015, p.35). Of course precisely 
what Sosa agrees with Baehr about is a subtle issue. For example, one of Sosa’s key 
tenets is that, contrary to objections from many responsibilist virtue epistemologists, a 
responsibilist component has always been incorporated within reliabilist virtue 
epistemology (Sosa 2015, p.35). Also, his precise way of “welcoming responsibilism at 
the core of virtue reliabilism” goes via a claim, first, that we should recognize a kind of 
“active, volitional virtue” that is a “special case of reliable competence intellectual 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing the ad hocery worry.  
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virtue”, and, second, that we should understand responsibilist virtues as “auxiliary to the 
special case of reliable-competence intellectual virtue” (Sosa 2015, p. 35-36). Again, the 
details would take us too far afield. For now, suffice it to say that—however the details 
get fleshed out—the most prominent virtue reliabilists are interested in making an 
important place for responsibilism within a reliabilist framework.29  
 
I agree with Sosa and Baehr that a complete virtue epistemology would incorporate 
elements from both camps, rather than focus heavily on their differences. These are 
reasons that an appeal to one kind of virtue epistemology goes naturally with an appeal to 
the other—reasons that have nothing special to do with the present context. So pointing 
out that we have resources from both camps is not an ad hoc way of defending the 
Derivate Norms Framework. Indeed, I think the fact that it helps the Framework is one 
more reason to see the two camps as fitting naturally together.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
I have argued for a number of points in this paper, so let’s take stock. First, I explained 
how the Derivative Norms Framework inspires a way to advance debate beyond Gerken’s 
objection to the so-called “excuse maneuver”. Next I raised the objection that excuse 
defenses are too weak or negative sounding in certain important cases. Dealing with this 
issue generates pressure in two directions. The first source of pressure is making excuses 
seem like a positive enough defense. The second source of pressure is filling that story 
out in a way that seems general and principled enough to avoid rekindling Gerken-style 
worries about ad hocery. Finally, I turned to a positive proposal. I argued that we should 
fill the Derivative Norms Framework out with resources from two kinds of virtue 
epistemology. In particular, I claimed that we should understand compliance with ODN 
in terms of the manifestation of cognitive virtues. The result is a view about the nature of 
epistemic excuses that can deal with both sources of pressure. 
 
The aim of this paper has not been to defend strong externalism over all other views 
about epistemic justification. Rather, the aim has been to examine the motivation for the 
strong externalist’s appeal to excuses. Does it merely help the strong externalist deal with 
some problematic cases? Or does it latch onto an independently motivated conception of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Note, too, that there is room to challenge the position—mentioned briefly above—that reliabilist virtue 
theory is a virtue theory in name only. For example, by appealing to lesser known but no less historically 
important usages of “virtue” (for example in Plato and Aquinas),29 Greco (2000) argues that one cannot 
settle the question of the correct or fundamental usage of “virtue” simply by deferring to Aristotle (he 
claims Zagzebski’s objection to the reliabilist usage of “virtue” hinges on this): “If we do not make 
Aristotle's account of moral virtue definitional of the concept of virtue in general, then we can see that 
Sosa, Goldman and Zagzebski are members of an important camp; one appropriately labeled ‘virtue 
epistemology’” (Greco 2000, p.181).  	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the structure of epistemic normativity? I have argued in support of the latter. Perhaps 
surprisingly, virtue epistemology provides resources for explaining how agents can be 
excused for holding unjustified beliefs, depending on whether they comply with the 
relevant derivative norms.  
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